China’s vulnerability in Malacca Strait

China’s vulnerability in Malacca Strait
March 20, 2009
Toronto, ON, Canada, — The Strait of Malacca is where the Pacific Ocean meets the Indian Ocean. It is the route that China-bound oil shipments take. All India must do to prevent a Chinese invasion of its northeast or Kashmir is to block this route. With its naval build-up of the last 10 years, and especially its recently announced purchases, India could do this.
India has U.S.-made submarine hunter-killer planes – Boeing P-8s equipped with Harpoon missiles – one Russian and one Indian-made aircraft carrier, French Scorpene attack submarines and an Indian-built nuclear submarine with missiles reaching hundreds of miles. It can arm its Russian and Indian-made destroyers and frigates with Brahmos sea-denial missiles, and has shore-based naval attack capability. The Chinese could not cope with this formidable force.

Add to this India’s growing network-centric capability and the Chinese are completely outmaneuvered.

If China put together a large force to neutralize India at the western end of the Strait of Malacca, it would weaken its home naval defenses in the South China Sea. Hence, China will continue to posture and send its navy on Indian Ocean cruises – but a formidable opposition is already building.

Moving into the Indian Ocean prematurely was a wrong move on China’s part. It alerted India and prompted a defensive build-up to counter China’s advances. China’s recent deployment of naval destroyers in the Gulf of Aden on anti-piracy missions revealed its newly acquired naval capability. An incident concocted by the Chinese press, in which an Indian Kilo-class submarine allegedly confronted a Chinese Aegis-class ship in the Gulf of Somalia, indicated China’s deep concerns about the growing prowess of the Indian Navy.

All China’s moves in the Indian Ocean – such as acquiring Coco Island from Myanmar and building up Gawadar Naval base in Pakistan – have been to intimidate India. India got the message and has begun building up its own naval forces. Its naval base in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, at the mouth of the Malacca Strait, gives India a big advantage.

China’s offensive naval capability away from home has grown exponentially with the acquisition of nuclear submarines. It is refitting a Russian and a homemade aircraft carrier, which may be ready in seven years. Surveillance capability from Coco Island off the Myanmar coast has also enhanced its effectiveness.

Chins has four Sovremenny-class destroyers purchased from the Russians and delivered in 2000 and 2006. These are its most potent warships. Originally designed by the Soviets to attack U.S. naval flotillas on the high seas, the Moskit anti-ship missile is a very potent weapon. But its limited range of 10 to 120 kilometers is lower than the Indian Brahmos sea-denial missile, with a range of 300 kilometers. Sovremenny-class ships also carry long- and short-range ship-to-shore missiles – effective if the Chinese get too close to Indian coastal bases.

China has launched its own “total weapons system” in its Aegis-equipped destroyers, developed from stolen and copied Russian technology to counter U.S. Aegis-class ships on Taiwan patrol duty. Its capability to launch long-range anti-aircraft missiles and sea surveillance is noteworthy, but how closely the Chinese copy resembles the original is unknown.

Most noteworthy in China’s naval arsenal is its fleet of submarines. In the last 10 years China has taken delivery of 12 Russian Kilo-class submarines. These, together with two new nuclear-powered submarines – the Jin class to carry ballistic missiles and Shang class attack submarines – are more potent than their ships. Nuclear ballistic missiles on board the Jin-class submarine are meant to intimidate the United States and Japan.

A large mix of these ships and submarines could travel to the Indian Ocean from China’s newly built naval dock facilities on Hainan Island and confront India or the United States.

The private intelligence agency Stratfor has concluded that by 2015 China will have two aircraft carriers – one Chinese and one Russian, but refitted by China – and two to four nuclear submarines. But China faces immense challenges in building these. Without outside help, their reliability and effectiveness are in doubt.

India’s naval expansion is not far behind. It is adding six conventional submarines from France and 33 other ships in the next five years. In addition, one or two nuclear submarines plus an aircraft carrier of Indian design and a refitted Russian one should be ready in the next two and eight years respectively.

Overall, India currently operates 134 ships, 16 submarines and two, possibly three aircraft carriers. Indian submarines are relatively modern. The French Scorpene submarines are stealth and independent propulsion and can stay under water for long periods. The nuclear submarines will carry 700-kilometer-range missiles.

One Indian nuclear submarine with its indigenous missile system is in the final phase of construction. If the Chinese position a nuclear submarine off the coast of India, the Indians can send their own nuclear submarine into position off the southern coast of China. This tit-for-tat deployment will deny China the advantage.

India’s destroyers and frigates are equipped with longer-range supersonic Brahmos missiles and carry Barak-1 anti-missile defense systems. Its aircraft carrier is presently equipped with Sea Harrier jump jets, but these will be replaced with highly lethal naval version MIG-29Ks. The newer aircraft carriers will have more advanced weapons and aircraft.

It is the Indian P-8s, the newly ordered surveillance and submarine hunter-killer planes, that are a force to reckon with. They can pick out a submarine hundreds of miles from Indian shores and “kill” it with Harpoon missiles. Add to this the shore-based defense network and the enemy will have no place to hide or get away.

In addition, India’s network-centric battlefield interconnectivity has greatly enhanced the navy’s reach. It is a strategic force multiplier. Its availability to any navy enhances the entire spectrum of management including diplomacy, humanitarian assistance, strategic deterrence, trade and commerce and security.

India made its first inroads into network-centric warfare immediately after the Kargil War of 1999. The United States is the leader in this new concept but India, with its vast software development capability, is not far behind. At the moment the Indian navy is just about network enabled and is moving progressively toward the network-centric concept. A huge software and hardware development effort is underway.

Also India’s newly constructed Kadamba naval base matches China’s newly built facility on Hainan Island. When completed, it will be a naval base, air force station and naval armament depot with long-range missile silos. It is a US$8 billion facility, the third in a series of integrated navy bases on the country’s east and west coasts. Kadamba will berth 42 ships, including aircraft carriers and submarines. It will repair and refit all navy ships and naval planes. It is a giant base with easy access to the Indian Ocean.

Hence, by 2015 India will have a formidable naval defense. Most of the Indian hardware has been built with outside help and is highly sophisticated, outclassing China-built hardware.

Therefore, a smaller but deadlier force is what China will face in the Indian Ocean. There is one wild card however – Pakistan, which could take advantage of India’s preoccupation with the Malacca Strait to gain mileage for its own strategic aims.

In short, nobody can say that China’s navy 10 years hence will be a pussycat. But in the Indian Ocean, China will face a much bigger challenge than it anticipated.

why no public transport system in bahrain

i recently visited bahrain its such a beautiful place thats the reason its called
the pearl of gulf,i understand that bahrain is an oil rich nation and petrol and bottled water come alomst at the same price
but as its an island country and artificial land is being bulit be reclaiming sea
the number of cars here are really too much
i cant understand why the government does not build a strong public transport syste mlike a metro train it would be such a beautiful thing for this beautiful country
you could reach from one place to another in a matter of few minutes be metro train where as by car it takes so much time and also fuel and therefore the pollution level also rises with every car
i sincerely cannot understand still why no strong public transport system that runs on electricity is being looked into for this country and if its being lookied into
it would be really great for the health and lifestyle of the people of bahrain

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE FUTURE WEAPONS PROPOSALS AIR FORCE 2025 STUDY

Hypersonic Attack Aircraft A high-speed strike vehicle capable of projecting lethal force anywhere in the world in less than four hours. Operating at Mach 12 and a cruise altitude of 100,000 ft, this vehicle is a reusable two-stage system comprised of an unmanned boost vehicle and a manned hypersonic strike aircraft. The gas turbine-engined boost vehicle requires a conventional runway and accelerates the strike vehicle to Mach 3.5 and 65,000 ft. The strike vehicle then separates and uses a ramjet/scramjet engine to reach its cruise condition. The total system range is 10,000 nautical miles ; the hypersonic strike vehicle has an unrefueled range of 5,000 NM. It is capable of launching precision-guided munitions, including the hypersonic air-to-ground missile described in system 5.4, at a standoff distance of 1,450 NM. Alternatively, the platform may be used to transport an uninhabited unmanned air vehicle described in system 4.2.

FotoFighter A highly maneuverable, stealthy, inhabited advanced fighter aircraft whose skin is fitted with an array of diode lasers and sensors. Efficient electronic control of the laser arrays allows this fighter to engage multiple targets simultaneously with varying degrees of lethality. At low powers, the arrays can function as transmitters and receivers for low probability of interception (LPI) communications. Threat detection, target illumination, and tracking are also possible.

Container Aircraft An aircraft consisting of an airlifter in which standard shipping containers form integral structures of the fuselage. The aircraft consists of three baseline sections: the cockpit, the wingbox, and the empennage. In its simplest form, the “short” version-the aircraft is capable of flight by joining the cockpit, wingbox, and empennage directly together. With standard shipping containers installed between the cockpit and wingbox and between the wingbox and the empennage, the aircraft can be configured to carry cargo (”stretch” version). The first wave of container aircraft to arrive in a theater of operations “disassembled.” The cockpit then forms a command and control facility, the aircraft engines generate the base power, the wings provide fuel storage, and the containers themselves (when empty) provide shelter for troops, supplies, and equipment. This concept provides a mobile base.

Lighter-than-Air Airlifter A very large capacity, rigid-frame lighter-than-air vehicle that provides one million pound airlift capability with a unrefueled range of 1,2500 NM. This vehicle also has the ability to deploy and recover powered UAVs while stationary or in-transit. Vehicle is able to house support materiel, personnel, and MEDVAC modules depending upon mission requirements.

Supersonic Airlifter A Mach 2.4 supersonic airlifter that provides 50,000 pound airlift capability with a unrefueled range of 5,000 NM. This vehicle provides the capability to deliver military personnel (roughly 150), advanced precision weapons, and appropriate resupply anywhere in the world within hours.

Stealth Airlifter (SA) An all-weather, low-observable aircraft capable of low supersonic cruise and dedicated to special operations forces (SOF). With an unrefueled range up to 4,000 NM, it can be used to insert and extract SOF teams, as well as to extract high value assets (HVA) and weapons of mass destruction. The SA connected to a global information management system (say, GIMS System 8.1) for all source intelligence, weather, navigation, and communications.

Global Transport Aircraft (GTA) A global reach transport airplane of less than one million pounds take off gross weight, capable of carrying 150,000-250,000 pounds 12,000 to 10,000 NM respectively. This vehicle also can deploy powered UAVs and parafoils. The GTA house support materiel, personnel, and MEDVAC modules, depending upon mission requirements. This aircraft also be modified for use as a tanker.

Strike UAV A low-observable, uninhabited air vehicle that loiters subsonically over the region of interest for long periods of time (24+ hours) until directed to strike. Its primary mission is to engage ground targets with standoff precision munitions; however, it also has a limited air-to-air capability. It relies on off-board sensors to supply reconnaissance and targeting information as well as command and control, although it has sufficient on-board sensor capability to allow it to perform preprogrammed missions.

Reconnaissance UAV An uninhabited reconnaissance aerial vehicle (URAV) that can be employed either as an independent system or in conjunction with other airborne, ground-based, and spaceborne systems. The URAV is fitted with a variety of multispectral sensors, such as infrared, optical, radar, and laser, and collects images, signals intelligence (SIGINT), electronic intelligence (ELINT), and other information. It loiters subsonically at very high altitudes over the region of interest for extended periods of time without refueling. The URAV also can be used as part of a bistatic configuration, in which it illuminates the region of interest while different sensors receive and process the information.

Uninhabited Combat Air Vehicle (UCAV) A vehicle that can be employed either as an independent system or in conjunction with other airborne, ground-based, and space- based systems. It carries a suite of multispectral sensors (optical, infrared, radar, laser, etc.) supplies information to its suite of standoff precision guided munitions. UCAV loiters at high altitude over the region of interest for long periods of time (24+ hours) until called upon to strike a target. While in its subsonic loiter mode, it can perform a surveillance and reconnaissance mission for the Global Information Management System (System 8.1). It could be used as part of a bistatic configuration in which it illuminates a region of interest while a different sensor receives and processes the information. As a secondary mission, it can perform electronic countermeasures (ECM) and electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM) roles.

Precision Delivery System A suite of powered and parafoil UAVs capable of autonomous flight for the purpose of all-weather precision (within 1 meter) airdrop. High altitude (40,000 ft) precision airdrops can be achieved using GPS or INS-guided parafoil delivery systems. This technique allows equipment/supplies to be delivered to forward-deployed forces while transport aircraft remain hundreds of miles from the drop zone. Positions can be determined using light detection and ranging (LIDAR) or a GPS instrumented radio drop sound. Powered UAVs and deliver smaller, high value packages from greater standoff ranges.

UAV Mothership A large capacity, long-loiter-time, uninhabited subsonic air vehicle used to deploy and recover smaller combat UAVs. It also can replenish them with weapons and propellant. This air vehicle has the ability to collect, convert and store solar energy, and then transfer energy through physical means or via beaming to other airborne vehicles such as the FotoFighter (System 1.2).

Exfiltration Rocket (ER) A system designed to quickly extract special operations forces (SOF) teams from the mission area. This system would be brought in during the SOF insertion and assembled at the exfiltration launch site. After mission completion, the SOF team members load themselves and any other items, such as a high value asset (HVA) or weapon of mass destruction (WMD), into the ER and then take off. The payload and passengers are recovered via an air-retrievable payload system or through a “soft” landing in a friendly area.

Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle (OMV) An uninhabited orbital propulsion and docking system used to take payloads from an earth-to-orbit lift vehicle and place them in their final orbital plane, or used to fetch and return orbiting payloads to a central repair and recovery location. The system is be capable of carrying line replaceable units (LRU) to a damaged/degraded satellite and accomplishing on-site repair or replacement. It is designed to allow refueling of civil, commercial, and military satellites as well as the rearming of military space weapons platforms.

Orbital Combat Vehicle (OCV) An uninhabited orbital propulsion and docking system used to take payloads from an earth-to-orbit lift vehicle and place them in their final orbital plane, or used to fetch and return orbiting payloads to a central repair and recovery location. The system can also carry line replaceable units to a damaged/ degraded satellite and accomplish on-site repair or replacement. It is designed to allow refueling of civil, commercial, and military satellites as well as the rearming of military space weapons platforms. The OCV is fitted with a medium power high-energy laser system for limited defense and counterspace missions.

Satellite Bodyguards A small constellation of defensive satellites (approximately five) placed in close proximity to the protected asset. “Hunter-killers” actively seek out threats and incapacitate them with directed energy weapons. Detection of threats from the surface or air is done by an off-board sensor suite (say, systems 8.1 or 8.2) and supplied to the “hunter-killer” satellites. Detection of space-based threats is done by the “hunter-killer” satellites themselves. Decoy satellites appear identical (both electromagnetic and visual) to the protected assets to confuse an aggressor; when approached, the decoy can impact and disable the enemy craft.

Piloted SSTO Transatmospheric Vehicle A system that provides space support and global reach from the earth’s surface to low-earth orbit (LEO) using a combination of rocket and hypersonic air-breathing technology. The transatmospheric vehicle (TAV) takes off vertically, is refuelable in either air or space, and can land on a conventional runway. It has a variable payload capacity (up to 10,000 pounds) and performs as both a sensor and weapons platform. Alternate missions include satellite deployment and retrieval from LEO and deployment of an anti-ASAT weapon.

Uninhabited Air-Launched Transatmospheric Vehicle A multirole transatmospheric vehicle (TAV). Launched from an airborne platform (such as System 1.1), it is capable of rapid deployment (or retrieval) of satellites providing communication links, intelligence information, and so forth. It carries a suite of multispectral sensors (optical, infrared, radar, laser, etc.) for surveillance and reconnaissance missions. This TAV is a rocket-powered vehicle approximately the size of an F-15, capable of carrying several small satellites (6 ft x 6 ft x 6 ft, 1000 lbs each) to low earth orbit. Further, it could perform an antisatellite (ASAT) role. This TAV can land on a conventional runway.

Adjustable Yield Munition (AYM) An approach to achieve precise matching of the weapon’s effect to the target’s characteristics. By manipulating the explosive yield of a weapon (i.e., “dial-a-yield”), together can greatly reduce collateral damage. This is particularly advantageous when flexibility and precision are both required: a platform on patrol, awaiting targets of opportunity, can utilize the same weapon for a hard kill with a large yield or for a surgical, mission-only kill with a tailored yield. One approach to controlling the yield is to change the material composition of the explosive at the molecular level.

Advanced Air-to-Air Missile A long range air-to-air missile that receives real-time target information from off-board sensors and utilizes reactive jets and an on-board computer to acquire, pursue and destroy enemy air assets, including cruise missiles. Terminal tracking and guidance may employ a combination of LIDAR, Infrared (IR), radio frequency (RF), magnetic anomaly detection (MAD), Jet engine modulation (JEM), photographic, and acoustic sensors.

Airborne High-Power Microwave Weapon A pulsed power airborne high power microwave (HPM) system. This medium range weapons system constitutes the primary payload of the host escort defense aircraft. The system generates variable magnitude HPM fields that disrupt or destroy electrical components in the target region. It can engage both air and ground targets.

Standoff Hypersonic Missile An hypersonic air-to-ground missile launched from a hypersonic strike vehicle (System 1.1). It utilizes a scramjet to propel itself at Mach 8 toward the intended high-value target, then glides to target at Mach 4; its flight trajectory is altered as needed via off-board control. Its high-speed air-launched range is 1,450 NM.

Attack Microbots A term that describes a class of highly miniaturized (1 millimeter scale) electromechanical systems being deployable en masse and performing individual or collective target attack. Various deployment approaches are possible, including dispersal as an aerosol, transportation by a larger platform, and full flying/crawling autonomy. Attack is accomplished by a variety of robotic effectors, electromagnetic measures, or energetic materials. Some “sensor microbot” capabilities are required for target acquisition and analysis.

Airborne Holographic Projector A projector system that displays a three-dimensional visual image in a desired location, removed from the display generator. The projector can be used for psychological operations and strategic perception management. It is also useful for optical deception and cloaking, providing a momentary distraction when engaging an unsophisticated adversary.

Hybrid High-energy Laser System (HHELS) A system consisting of several ground-based, multimegawatt high-energy chemical lasers and a constellation of space-based mirrors. HHELS can be used in several modes of operation. In its weapons mode with the laser at high power, it engages air, space, and ground targets by reflecting a laser beam off one or more of the mirrors to the intended target. It can also be used for target tracking, limited space debris removal (1-10 centimeter objects), and replenishment of satellites.

Global Area Strike System (GLASS) A system incorporating of a high-energy laser (HEL) system, a kinetic energy weapon (KEW) system, and a transatmospheric vehicle (TAV). The HEL system consists of ground-based lasers and space-based mirrors which direct energy to the intended target. The KEW system (System 6.2) consists of terminally guided projectiles, with and without explosive enhancers. The TAV (System 4.1) is a flexible platform capable of supporting maintenance and replenishment of the HEL and KEW space assets, and can also be used for rapid deployment of special operations forces. Target definition and sequencing is managed externally (e. g., using GIMS (System 8.1)).

Space-Based Kinetic Energy Weapon (KEW) A general class of low earth orbit (LEO) based weapons that include a variety of warhead types from flechettes and pellets to large and small high density rods. The KEW may be directed at air, space, and ground targets; it achieves its destructive effect by penetrating the target at hypervelocity. Sensor information is provided to the KEW by a main sensor suite off-board of the vehicle (such as GSRT [System 8.2] or GIMS [System 8.1]). However, each armament has a minimal sensor capability (e. g., GPS receiver) and a simple flight control system for maneuver.

Space-Based High Power Microwave Weapon (HPM) A weapon system capable of engaging ground, air, and space targets with a varying degree of lethality. It consists of a constellation of satellites deployed in low-earth orbit (LEO) (approx. 500 NM) that can direct an ultrawideband (UWB) of microwave energy at ground, air, and space targets. Its effect is to generate high electric fields over a target area tens to hundreds of meters in size, thereby disrupting or destroying any electronic components present.

Space-Based High-energy Laser (HEL) System A multimegawatt high-energy chemical laser constellation that can be used in several modes of operation. In its weapons mode with the laser at high power, it can attack ground, air, and space targets. In its surveillance mode, it can operate using the laser at low power levels for active illumination imaging or with the laser inoperative for passive imaging.

Solar-Powered High-energy Laser System A space-based, multimegawatt, high-energy solar-powered laser constellation that can be used in several modes of operation. In its weapons mode with the laser at high power, it can attack ground, air, and space targets. In its surveillance mode, it can operate using the laser at low power levels for active illumination imaging, or with the laser inoperative for passive imaging.

Solar Energy Optical Weapon (SEOW) A constellation of space-based mirrors which allow solar radiation to be focused on specific ground, air, or space targets. The lethality of this system is limited, due to optical diffusion; however, it may prove useful for disruption or perhaps weather control.

Asteroid Mitigation System A system that protects the Earth/Moon system from Earth- crossing objects (ECOs) by either deflecting or fragmenting ECOs such that they no longer pose a threat. Deflection could be accomplished using nuclear explosive devices.

Spoken Language Translator A hand-held or worn device that translates oral communications in near real-time. It enhances multinational operational effectiveness in all areas, including training, diplomacy, special operations, and conventional ground operations. It is capable of one-for-one word substitution in a wide variety of languages, and it provides two-way communications between the owner and another person. The system has a limited ability to compensate for differences in sentence syntactic structures, cultures, dialects, and idioms/slang, and a limited ability to select words according to context. Careful placement of both microphones and both speakers is required for deconfliction (not having to hear both languages simultaneously), limiting the scope of its operation; the system is best suited for controlled two-way communications such as by telephone, radio, or computer. The system also is useful for written text translation.

Personal Digital Assistant (PDA) An individual’s connection to the information systems of 2025. This assistant is a hand-held or wristwatch size unit. Input modes include both touch and voice. The PDA is the warrior’s secure, high-capacity connection to the distributed C4I system. The PDA maintains the owner’s personal data such as medical and training records. It learns and remembers the owner’s preferences and needs so that requests for information are properly tailored. It is self-securing: it recognizes the owner through a number of biometrics which ensures that it cannot be commandeered. In short, the PDA is a single device replaces the cellular telephone, radio, personal computer, identification and banking cards, and any other personal information- management device of the nineties.

Virtual Interaction Center A virtual reality environment in which commanders can immerse themselves in a three-dimensional representation of the battlespace. Information from a global information system, such as GIMS (System 8.1) is displayed in a virtual reality environment, giving the commander situational awareness. The center also has the capability to replay battles and engagements and to simulate “what if” scenarios.

Global Information Management System (GIMS) A pervasive network of intelligent information gathering, processing, analysis, and advisory nodes. It collects, stores, analyzes, fuses, and manages information from ground/air/space sensors and all source intelligence. All types of sensors (i.e., acoustic, optical, radio frequency, olfactory, etc.) are used. However, the true power of this system is its use of neural processing to provide the right type of information based on the user’s personal requirements.

Global Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Targeting System (GSRT) A space-based omnisensorial collection, processing, and dissemination system to provide a real-time information database. This database is used to create a virtual-reality image of the area of interest. This image can be used at all levels of command to provide situational awareness, technical and intelligence information, and two-way command and control.

Sensor Microbots A class of highly miniaturized (millimeter sized) electromechanical air and ground systems capable of being deployed en masse to collect data, perform individual and collective data fusion, and communicate that data for further processing and distribution. Various deployment approaches are possible, including dispersal as an aerosol, transportation by a larger platform, and full flying/crawling autonomy. Data collection is accomplished through miniaturized onboard sensors, typically restricted to one or two sensors per unit due to size and power limitations. Communications are possible by transmission through relay stations (”relaybots”) or physical collection of the microbots. Some applications of sensor microbots are security net to guard own assets, surveillance and reconnaissance, and intelligence gathering on adversary assets.

Multiband Laser Sensor System A suite of laser devices that inspects and models target components. Different frequencies of electromagnetic energy vary in their ability to penetrate materials. For a particular material, one frequency will reflect off the surface, another will penetrate. By employing a suite of laser devices over a wide frequency range, planners can accomplish complete internal and external inspection of a structure and develop a full three-dimensional model. This tool can be used for nondestructive inspection of components, target vulnerability analysis, target identification and decoy rejection, and reconnaissance. This suite of laser devices can be carried on an airborne platform, but it clearly has ground-based applications also.

Asteroid Detection System A network of ground and space sensors which search for, track, and characterize space objects that are large enough and in an orbit to threaten the earth-moon system. The system also includes a centralized processing center that fuses data from all of the available sensors, catalogs the known objects, and distributes information to the known authorities.

Mobile Asset Repair Station (MARS) A mobile facility near the battlefront where parts can be repaired or manufactured . In wartime, replacement parts are repaired or manufactured in the theater of operations for a variety of deployed weapon systems through MARS. The mobile facility can be land-based or water-based in the theater of operations, but out of harm’s way. The facility features a set of fully-integrated flexible manufacturing systems (FMS) and robotic systems that are linked to the commercial manufacturers. These manufacturers supply the specifications to the FMS which then produces the part or component. Many of the required materials necessary for MARS to manufacture the components obtained from local countries.

Weather Analysis and Modification System A diverse set of weather prediction and modification tools that allows manipulation of small-to-medium-scale weather phenomena to enhance friendly-force capabilities and degrade those of the adversary. Many of the sensors required for this system are assumed to be external e. g., part of the global information management system (GIMS), discussed in System 8.1.

Sanctuary Base A secure, low observable, all-weather forward-operating base that reduces the number of assets requiring protection from attack. The runway, power systems, ordnance storage, aircraft maintenance assets, and C4I systems are self-maintaining and self-repairing. Base security is highly automated. Chemical/ biological hazards are cleaned up by nanobots and biotechnology. Robots perform refueling, weapons loading, maintenance, security, and explosive ordnance destruction.

Russia to deliver Admiral Gorshkov to India after 2011

GELENDZHIK (South Russia), September 5 (RIA Novosti) – Russia will deliver the modernized Admiral Gorshkov aircraft carrier to India after 2011, Russia’s state-run arms exporter said on Friday.

“We are planning to deliver the aircraft carrier to India after 2011, but an addendum to the original contract must be signed,” Mikhail Zavaliy, a Rosoboronexport official told reporters at an air show in the Krasnodar Region.

The original $750-million contract to deliver the Admiral Gorshkov aircraft carrier to India, which Rosoboronexport signed with the Indian Navy in 2004, projected the work would be completed in 2008.

However, Russia later claimed it underestimated the scale and the cost of the modernization and demanded an additional $1.2 billion, which New Delhi said was “exorbitant.”

After long-running delays and disputes, Russia and India agreed in February to raise refit costs for the aircraft carrier, docked at the Sevmash shipyard in northern Russia for the past 12 years,

by at least $800 million.

The current contract covers a complete overhaul of the ship and equipping it with modern weaponry, including MiG-29K Fulcrum aircraft and Ka-27 Helix-A and Ka-31 Helix-B anti-submarine helicopters.

The carrier, renamed the Vikramaditya, is to replace India’s INS Viraat carrier, which, although currently operational, is now 50 years old.

The Sevmash shipyard said on June 3 it planned to sail the aircraft carrier out into the Barents Sea for trials in 2011. In early 2012, the ship is expected to be finally refitted and trials will continue into the summer of that year.

At the end of 2012, the aircraft carrier is expected to be fully prepared for its handover to the Indian navy, the company said.

After it has been refitted, the Gorshkov is expected to be seaworthy for 30 years.

 

Pak presidential candidate Zardari suffers from severe mental problems

August 26th, 2008 – 10:06 am ICT by ANI

London, Aug 26 (ANI): Pakistan presidential hopeful and PPP Co-chairman Asif Ali Zardari was suffering from severe mental illness till last year, as he underwent severe torture during his 11 years of imprisonment in the past two decades in different prisons.

He was diagnosed with a range of psychiatric illnesses, including dementia, major depressive disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder.

In March 2007, New York psychiatrist Philip Saltiel found that Zardaris time in detention left him with severe emotional instability, memory loss and concentration problems. I do not see any improvement in these issues for at least a year, he wrote in a medical report.

This has been disclosed in court documents related to Zardaris corruption cases. Zardari used the medical reports to successfully fight a now defunct English High Court case in which the Pakistan government sought to sue him over alleged corruption. The case was dropped in March.

Stephen Reich, a psychiatrist from New York State , said Zardari was unable to recall the birthdays of his wife and children and had thought about suicide, reported the Telegraph.

Zardari was not available to comment on the documents, but Wajid Shamsul Hasan, the Pakistan high commissioner to London said he was now fit and well.

Zardari is his party’’s candidate to succeed Pervez Musharraf as president of the nuclear-armed country. However, his coalition government with former prime minister Nawaz Sharif, fell apart yesterday after Sharif withdrew his party, the The Pakistan Muslim League-N. (ANI)

http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/south-asia/pak-presidential-candidate-zardari-suffers-from-severe-mental-problems_10088590.html

Pak presidential candidate Zardari suffers from severe mental problems

Pak presidential candidate Zardari suffers from severe mental problems

Moscow, Minsk to build air def in response to US missiles in Europe

Moscow, Minsk to build air def in response to US missiles in Europe
20.08.2008, 21.51

By Itar-Tass World Service writer Lyudmila Alexandrova

Creation of a common air defense system of Russia and Belarus may prove the retaliatory measure the deployment of US missile defense components in Poland and the Czech Republic may entail.

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and his Belarussian counterpart Alexander Lukashenko on Tuesday agreed that a treaty to this effect should be signed as early as this autumn.

Analysts say that Lukashenko at that meeting corrected some of his own mistakes. Whereas during the Russian peacemaking intervention in South Ossetia Minsk – nominally Moscow’s number one political ally – kept quiet, now, having received an unequivocal reprimand from Moscow, it hurried to present apologies.

Earlier, Lukashenko, who will be faced with no easy parliamentary elections in October, was trying to ‘build bridges’ to the West, and the Belarussian prime minister had a very cool reception by his Russian counterpart.

Analysts see a number of reasons for the change in Minsk’s position, including this one. The latest events have shown that Moscow is determined to play the key role in the post-Soviet space, and in doing so it will care little about the opinion of the “international community”, so-called.

Lukashenko on Tuesday at last expressed his attitude to the operation in South Ossetia. In the most flattering fashion he approved of Russia’s intervention.

“Everything was done excellently, very calmly, wisely and neatly. In a situation like this the West would act in a way that would cause the whole world to shudder,” he said.

“This belated approval of Russia’s actions by the Belarussian president looked so clumsy and out of place, that Dmitry Medvedev could not but at least feel regret all this happened in front of the cameras,” says the daily Vremya Novostei.

This meeting of the Russian and Belarussian leaders had been scheduled long before the peacemaking operation in South Ossetia, but the war in the Caucasus caused some major amendments to Russian-Belarussian relations, says the daily Kommersant. Moscow was very angry Minsk did not hurry to express solidarity with its line of action towards Georgia.

On the fifth day of the operation the Kremlin decided it was enough. The Russian ambassador to Belarus, Alexander Surikov, said, “It is not very clear to us why the Belarussian authorities modestly keep quiet.”

“One should be more explicit in expressing attitude to issues,” he said.

The ambassador’s angry message coincided with Alexander Lukashenko’s instruction to his foreign minister to take steps to better relations with the European Union and the United States.

“It looks like that move heated Moscow’s anger to the boiling point,” says the daily. “In those days there was much speculation around the world about the creation of a ’sanitary cordon’ of unfriendly states along Russia’s western borders – from Estonia to Georgia. Belarus could be regarded by Moscow as the sole breach in that cordon. Now it suddenly turned out that the breach is very doubtful. Moscow demanded from Minsk an absolutely clear expression of its position.

Lukashenko, although after a certain delay, used his chance. He fully backed Russia’s actions in Georgia and agreed to the creation of a common, unified air defense system with Russia.

Russian presidential aide Sergei Prikhodko said the two heads of state had agreed that an interstate agreement concerning a unified common air defense system should be finalized by the forthcoming session of the Supreme Council of the Union State, due in the autumn. The document is to be ready for signature at the session.

Analysts have assessed the results of the talks in positive terms, particularly so against the backdrop of the preceding meeting of Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and his Belarussian counterpart Sergei Sidorsky. The Belarussian prime minister, recalls the daily Gazeta, failed to persuade Russia to either reduce the price of gas in 2009, or to extend a long-term two-billion-dollar loan. In response to this refusal of economic assistance Belarus released from prison the Opposition’s leader, Alexander Kozulin, something the United States and the European Union had long pressed for.

“Whereas until last Tuesday Lukashenko’s attitude to the conflict in South Ossetia had been very reserved, now it has become obvious that the Belarussian leadership had strongly misjudged the situation. Now it has realized that a conflict with Russia would be far more dangerous,” the deputy director of the Political Technologies Center, Alexei Makarkin, told the daily Gazeta. “Now that Medvedev has negotiated the deployment of air defense weapons in the territory of a neighboring country in response to a similar agreement between Poland and the United States, Lukashenko will probably manage to achieve consensus over gas.”

Ambassador Alexander Surikov in early August said the military did not rule out the possibility Russian missile launchers Iskander and strategic bombers may be based in Belarus. The on-line daily Vzglyad says that in that case Russian missiles would be able to reach the interceptor missile base in Poland, although the Czech radar would still remain outside their range of action.

Political scientists believe that the CIS countries’ reserved reaction to Russia’s operation in Georgia merely indicates that both pro-Russian and pro-Western elites in the former Soviet republics have for years had to walk the tight rope between Russia and the West, securing benefits from their rivalry in the post-Soviet space.

In the early 2000s Russia stepped up pressures on the entire structure of relations that emerged in the region in the 1990s, says senior lecturer of at the world politics department of the Higher School of Economics, Andrei Suzdaltsev, in an article published on the Politcom.ru website. That previous structure took shape under the tremendous influence of the European Union, NATO and the United States.

“Naturally, that structure gave in to the pressures, the colored revolutions, the gas wars and a pile of other problems being the net effect. But the South Ossetian conflict has now made it clear that Russia will run the show. The CIS countries feel scared, because they for so long remained sandwiched between two rivals contesting influence in the post-Soviet space, Russia and the West.”

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